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BRAGG v. WEST VIRGINIA MINING ASSOCIATION THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO
MOUNTAINTOP COAL MINING
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, coal companies in West Virginia began
widespread use of mountaintop coal mining, a practice involving
the physical removal of mountain peaks to more effectively extract
low sulfur, high-grade coal.1 Using this method, mining companies
dig and blast mountaintop rock above horizontal seams of coal
layered in mountains, place the removed earth in adjacent valleys,
extract the coal, and replace the removed rock in an effort to
achieve the original contour of the mountain.2 Given that the rock
naturally "swells" after removal, the excess rock not returned to the
mountain, overburden, is left in the adjacent valleys, creating "val-
ley fills" that bury intermittent and perennial streams and drainage
areas near the mountaintop.3
Local communities and environmental groups, however, con-
demn the practice of mountaintop removal, pointing to its devastat-
ing environmental effects. 4 The groups assert that mountaintop
removal increases vulnerability to flooding, pollutes streams and riv-
ers, dries up local wells, increases vehicle traffic, provides little ben-
efit to the state economy, and causes significant physical damage to
1. See Penny Loeb, Shear Madness, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Aug. 11, 1997, at
26 (noting proliferation of mountaintop mining practices in West Virginia, south-
eastern Kentucky, eastern Tennessee, southwestern Virginia, and western Penn-
sylvania). West Virginia has granted surface mining permits for 512 square miles
of that State. See id. Presumably, the majority of those permits allow mountaintop
removal. See id. An aerial inspection of the region suggests that this practice has
affected fifteen to twenty percent of the mountain peaks in the south-central part
of West Virginia. See id.
2. See Bragg v. W. Va. Mining Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001)
(describing theoretical procedure used for mountaintop coal mining). To remove
topsoil, mining companies use a dragline, a $100 million machine that digs out
earth with a bucket capable of digging out 110 cubic yards in a single scoop. See
Loeb, supra note 1, at 26. Next, miners blast the overburden into large pieces and
remove it to adjacent valleys using the dragline and several large dump trucks. See
id.
3. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286 (stating effect resulting from mountaintop re-
moval process on removed rock and adjacent valleys). The court notes that re-
moved rock swells as much as fifteen to twenty-five percent. See id.
4. See Loeb, supra note 1, at 26 (recognizing damaging environmental effects
produced from mountaintop coal mining).
(287)
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nearby homes and communities. 5 Generally, coal companies de-
fend mountaintop coal mining by citing their effective land restora-
tion of the mountaintop areas and the economic benefit provided
to the community and state.6
Federal and state governments, through the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), regulate the practice of
mountaintop coal mining by limiting the types of mining permits
issued.7 SMCRA sets out a comprehensive list of minimum stan-
dards to guard against the potentially adverse environmental im-
pact of a surface mining operation.8 Congress crafted SMCRA to
provide a balance of responsibility between the federal and state
agencies, an effort known as cooperative federalism. 9 Through this
scheme of cooperative federalism, a state may take over the regula-
5. See id. From approximately 1995 to 1997, thirty floods occurred in areas
where watersheds were bared and redesigned, resulting in several deaths. See id.
An unpublished study by the Office of Surface Mining [hereinafter OSM] and the
Army Corps of Engineers [hereinafter Corps] states that valley fills resulting from
mountaintop removal could increase peak storm runoff by up to forty-two percent
in some areas. See Ken Ward, Mountaintop Removal Worsens Flooding, Study Finds,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE ONLINE, July 11, 2001, at http://www.wvgazette.com/dis-
play-story.php3?sid=2001071020&format=pm (last visited Sept. 5, 2001).
A 1994 study by West Virginia's Department of Water Resources found that
nearly seventy-six percent of the State's streams have been polluted. See Loeb,
supra note 1, at 26. "Much of this-no one knows exactly how much-is caused by
surface mining." Id. According to one federal mining expert, "virtually every
stream at a mountaintop removal site becomes contaminated with sediment from
the mine." Id.
Regarding the economic impact, state employment records suggest that
mountaintop removal accounts for only 4,317jobs in the state, less than one per-
cent of West Virginia's workforce. See id. Critics of the mountaintop mining prac-
tice also point to the economic damage in terms of tourism on the waterways, "the
state's most valuable tourist attractions." Id.
Furthermore, mountaintop removal causes other problems. "Trucks full of
coal rumble past some people's front porches at the rate of 20 an hour, 24 hours a
day." Id. Moreover, in terms of local wells, "[m]ining dries up an average of 100
wells a year and contaminates water in others." Id. In terms of physical damage,
dynamite blasts needed to splinter rock strata crack walls and foundations of
nearby homes. See id. In 1996, "[h]omeowners filed 287 blasting complaints with
the state." Id. Blasting also launches rocks into the nearby communities, including
one local cemetery. See id.
6. See Loeb, supra note 1, at 26. Coal companies contend that they practice
adequate reclamation procedures by smoothing the ground and planting grass,
shrubs, and small trees. See id. "In the best reclamations, the land is contoured
and waterfowl ponds added." Id. Mining companies also note that mining re-
mains a critical source of revenue for the West Virginia economy and creates many
high paying jobs, bringing in $4.4 billion in 1996. See id.
7. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1994) (setting forth regulations of Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act [hereinafter SMCRA]).
8. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (1994) (listing SMCRA's environmental protection
performance standards).
9. For a further discussion of the aspects of cooperative federalism embodied
in SMCRA, see infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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tory enforcement of SMCRA once the Federal Office of Surface
Mining (OSM) approves that state's proposed plan for
enforcement. 10
Citizen suit provisions, common to nearly every environmental
regulation since the 1970s, allow individual citizens to sue both gov-
ernment and private parties for SMCRA violations.' The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision, in Bragg v. West Virginia
Mining Association,1 2 however, threatens to frustrate citizen suit en-
forcement actions under both SMCRA and various other environ-
mental statutes. 13 This decision may upset the delicate balance
sought in cooperative federalism schemes and render citizens pow-
erless to hold states accountable under federally-enacted environ-
mental statutes.1 4
Section II of this Note outlines the factual and procedural
background of Bragg v. West Virginia Mining Association.15 Section
III sets out general background law, covering the framework of SM-
CRA, the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity provision,
and the split among the federal circuits regarding the nature of
state-approved SMCRA programs.1 6 Section IV analyzes the Fourth
Circuit's decision and presents possible legal challenges to that
holding.' 7 Section V concludes the Note with an examination of
the impact of the Bragg decision on the successful implementation
of SMCRA as well as the decision's impact on related "cooperative
federalism" environmental statutes. 18
10. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (1994) (revealing "cooperative effort" established
by SMCRA); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994) (setting out requirements for state to
assume regulatory jurisdiction).
11. See 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994) (granting any person with adversely af-
fected interests power to bring civil suit against United States or appropriate state
regulatory authority). For a listing of citizen suits in similar environmental stat-
utes, see infra note 43 and accompanying text.
12. 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
13. See Sharon Buccino et al., Hostile Environment: How Activist Judges Threaten
Our Air, Water, and Land, National Resources Defense Council 1, 15-17 (July 2001),
available at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/hostile/hostile.pdf (outlining variety
of legal challenges to environmental statutes in recent judicial decisions).
14. See id. (characterizing Eleventh Amendment attacks as emerging threat to
effectiveness of environmental protection statutes).
15. For a discussion of the factual background of Bragg, see infra notes 19-31
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the general background law surrounding SMCRA citi-
zen suits, see infra notes 32-115 and accompanying text.
17. For a narrative and critical analysis of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Bragg, see infra notes 116-76 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of how the Bragg decision might affect the future of envi-
ronmental citizen suits, see infra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
2002] 289
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II. FACTS
In 1998, Patricia Bragg and a host of other complainants
(Bragg) filed a citizen suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia against the State Director of
the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (State Di-
rector or Director) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps).19 In three counts asserted against the State Director,
Bragg alleged that the issuance of permits for mountaintop mining
operations by the State Director violated SMCRA and the West Vir-
ginia state program approved under that statute. 20 More specifi-
cally, Bragg alleged that the State Director "engaged in an ongoing
pattern and practice of violating his non-discretionary duties" in
granting permits that "authorized valley fills, failed to assure the
restoration of original mountain contours, and violated other envi-
ronmental protection laws."21 Accordingly, Bragg requested that
the court grant an injunction to stop the Director from issuing
mountaintop removal permits that "decapitate the State's moun-
tains" and bury "hundreds of miles of headwaters of West Virginia's
streams."22
In the district court, Chief Judge Charles Haden, II, granted
Bragg's motion for summary judgment, determining that the
State's approval of mountaintop mining practices within 100 feet of
intermittent and perennial streams violated both federal and state
law. 23 Accordingly, the district court issued an injunction against
the State Director. 24 The district court also entered consent de-
19. See Bragg v. W Va. Mining Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001). Bragg
charged that Corps breached its duties imposed by federal law and that the State
Director of the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection [hereinafter
Director or State Director] violated both state and federal duties under SMCRA.
Id. at 286-87. Several coal companies intervened in the suit to protect their inter-
ests. Id.
20. See id. at 286-87 (charging that Director violated both federal and state
law).
21. Id. (noting Bragg's assertions that State Director violated federal and state
law in not "withhold[ing] approval of permit applications that are not complete
and accurate and in compliance with all requirements of ... state program.").
22. Id. at 285 (noting general reasoning behind injunction sought by Bragg).
23. Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 2000). As to the
alleged violation, the West Virginia SMCRA program states that "[n]o land within
one hundred feet of an intermittent or perennial stream shall be disturbed by
surface mining operations including roads unless specifically authorized by the Di-
rector." Bragg, 248 F.3d at 287 n.2 (citing W. VA. CODE ST. R. tit. 38 § 2-5.2
(1985)); see also Permanent Program Enforcement Standards - Surface Mining Ac-
tivities, 30 C.F.R. § 816.57 (2001) (stating federal counterpart to state's buffer zone
requirement).
24. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 285-86.
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crees approving settlement of other asserted claims against both
Corps and the State Director. 25
The State Director appealed both the substantive rulings on
the counts not settled and the court's ruling that the federal court
had sufficientjurisdiction over him in light of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.26 Likewise, the coal companies and coal associations ap-
pealed the injunction against the State Director, as well as the
court's approval of the consent decree of the settlement, which had
not been appealed by the State Director.27 Finally, Corps appealed,
challenging the district court's jurisdiction to hear the case.28
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's injunction and remanded
the matter to the appropriate state court.29 The Fourth Circuit
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred any suit by citizens of
that state seeking to enjoin the Director from granting
mountaintop coal mining permits, pursuant to the grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction under SMCRA and that mere participation by West
Virginia in the SMCRA scheme did not create a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.30 In addition, the court also held
that the district court had appropriate subject matter jurisdiction to
approve the consent decrees.31
25. See id. On December 23, 1998, Bragg and Corps settled their claims relat-
ing to the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. See id. at 287 n.1. On July 26, 1999, Bragg and the
State Director settled all counts except for counts two and three. See id. The dis-
trict court approved these settlements as "fair, adequate, reasonable, and faithful
to the environmental statutes." Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 653, 670 (S.D.
W. Va. 1999); see also Bragg v. Robertson, 83 F. Supp. 2d 713, 722 (S.D. W. Va.
2001).
26. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 288 (stating basis of State Director's appeal).
27. See id. at 287 n.1 (asserting that federal district court did not have jurisdic-
tion over State Director on any counts because SMCRA and Eleventh Amendment
barred action).
28. See id. at 288 (challenging breadth of district court's injunction).
29. See id. at 286 (stating general holding of Court of Appeals for Fourth
Circuit).
30. See id. at 280 (outlining basis for court's decision to vacate part of district
court's ruling).
31. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 288-89 (upholding validity of approved settlement).
20021
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
In response to the devastating 1972 flood of Buffalo Creek,
West Virginia, Congress passed SMCRA in 1977.32 SMCRA sought
to balance the interest in maintaining a healthy level of coal pro-
duction sufficient to satisfy the nation's energy requirements with
the federal interest in protecting the environment and local com-
munities from adverse effects of surface coal mining.33 SMCRA's
legislative history suggests that Congress intended SMCRA to
achieve that balance through a "cooperative effort" with power
shared between the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and the States. 34
To establish this "cooperative effort," SMCRA calls on the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior to develop a federal program setting forth
certain minimum national regulatory standards.35 A state has the
option to submit its own program, which must include those mini-
mum national standards and a demonstration of the state's ability
to enforce the proposed program. 36 Numerous other environmen-
tal statutes provide the same general cooperative federalism
scheme.3 7 If the Secretary approves the particular state program,
that state shall have "exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of
32. See Loeb, supra note 1, at 26 (indicating that 1972 Buffalo Creek flood,
sparked by dam break of 550-foot-wide coal slurry pond, destroyed homes further
than fifteen miles downstream and killed more than 125 people).
33. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1994) (noting that coal mining contributes sig-
nificantly to the Nation's energy requirements); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) (1994)
(stating that surface mining operations disturb surface areas in ways that adversely
affect commerce and public welfare).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 95-218, at 57 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593,
595 (stating general character of SMCRA regulation); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (k)
(1994) (citing necessity of cooperative effort to "prevent or mitigate adverse envi-
ronmental effects of present and future coal mining operations.").
35. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1994) (stating, in pertinent part, that general
performance standards shall operate as minimum standards to prevent and correct
environmental harm done to mining areas). For example, surface coal mining
operations must "restore the land affected to a condition capable of supporting
the uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining. . . ." 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265(b)(2) (1994). Mountaintop operations must also take measures to guard
against actions that would increase the likelihood of flooding. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265(b) (10) (1994) (stating need to "minimize the disturbances to the prevail-
ing hydrologic balance . . .to the quality and quantity of water in surface and
ground water systems both during and after the surface coal mining operations.").
36. See 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1994) (noting that states desiring exclusive juris-
diction shall submit "a State program which demonstrates that such State has the
capability of carrying out the provisions of [SMCRA] and meeting its purposes...
(1) ... in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.").
37. See Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994) (requiring each state to
submit state implementation plan for Administrator's approval); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)
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surface coal mining and reclamation operations ... ,"38 In 1981,
the Secretary approved West Virginia's proposed program, thus
granting that state "primacy" status.39 In total, twenty-four states
have attained "primacy" status, while federally-implemented pro-
grams operate in twelve other states. 40
If a state fails to implement, enforce, or maintain its approved
state program, the Secretary has the duty to prepare and imple-
ment a federal program for that state.41 After adequate public no-
tice, " [i] n the event that a State ... is not enforcing any part of [its]
program, the Secretary may provide for Federal enforcement... of
that part of the State program not being enforced .... 42
Under SMCRA, aggrieved parties may file a civil action, a "citi-
zen suit," to compel compliance with SMCRA. 43 In pertinent part,
the citizen suit provision grants a state citizen the right to sue either
the United States or the appropriate state regulatory authority "to
the extent permitted by the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Con-
stitution" for an alleged failure to perform any non-discretionary
(1994) [hereinafter CERCLA] (allowing state to apply to President to carry out
actions authorized under CERCLA).
38. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1994). "[T]he primary governmental responsibility
for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining
and reclamation operations . . .should rest with the States" given the diversity
among the states in terrain, climate, biologic, and other physical characteristics.
30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1994).
39. See Programs for the Conduct of Surface Mining Operations within Each
State, West Virginia State Regulatory Program Approval, 30 C.F.R. § 948.10 (2001)
(noting Secretary of Interior's approval of West Virginia's state plan).
40. See Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 125 F.3d 231, 234 n.3 (4th Cir.
1997). Those states that have SMCRA approved state programs include: Alaska,
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wy-
oming. See Mark Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way To Run A Government?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,039, 10,043 n.24 (1985).
41. See 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994) (referring to promulgation and implemen-
tation powers of Secretary).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b)-(c) (1994) (providing federal Secretary conditional
authority to commandeer enforcement of SMCRA state program in light of state's
failure to do so).
43. See 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994). Nearly every major environmental statute
since the 1970 Clean Air Act has contained a citizen suit provision. SeeJefferson
Reynolds, Defanging Environmental Law: Extracting Citizen Suit Provisions Under Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 12J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 78 (1997). For exam-
ples of citizen suits in environmental statutes, see Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1994); see also Federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).
2002]
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duty.44 The statute further notes that "[t]he district court shall
have jurisdiction [over citizen suits], without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties."45 Thus, determin-
ing whether a party can bring a citizen suit requires the courts to
decide the extent of the Eleventh Amendment's application to state
programs enacted under SMCRA. 46
B. The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that "[t] he Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 4 7 Early Supreme
Court cases, however, expanded the Amendment's reach beyond its
mere text.48 In Hans v. Louisiana,49 the United States Supreme
Court found that the spirit of the Constitution and intent of the
ratifying states add an implied constraint on suits brought by a
state's own citizens even though not explicitly mentioned in the
text.50 The purpose behind state sovereign immunity is to create a
balance between a state's interest in interpreting and enforcing its
own laws and the federal government's interest in uniform applica-
tion of federal law. 5 1
Since the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme
Court has recognized several exceptions to the idea of state sover-
eign immunity.52 Among those exceptions, Ex parte Young5 3 estab-
lished that the Eleventh Amendment does not cover suits for
44. See 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994) (asserting extent of citizen suit provision).
45. Id. (stating location of appropriate jurisdiction).
46. See id. (using Eleventh Amendment as limit to citizen suit).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
48. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (upholding
view that Supreme Court has "understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not
so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms.").
49. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
50. See id. at 15 (barring federal action by state citizen against own state due to
absence of express textual language).
51. See id. (noting that suits against individual states were not contemplated
when judicial power was established under Constitution).
52. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496
U.S. 18 (1990) (finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to
Supreme Court's authority to review federal questions); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1 (1982) (noting state can waive Eleventh Amendment protection); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (finding that independent agencies or po-
litical subdivisions within state, such as municipalities, do not enjoy such Eleventh
Amendment protection).
53. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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prospective injunctive relief by a state citizen against state officials
to enforce constitutional or federal law.54 The Ex parte Young ex-
ception focuses on the idea that when a state officer violates federal
law, that officer is stripped of official character and becomes subject
to the consequences of individual conduct, thus losing the cloak of
sovereign immunity. 55 Almond Hill School v. United States Department
of Agriculture56 affirms that the Ex parte Young "stripping doctrine"
applies to violations of both federal statutory law and federal consti-
tutional law.57 Aside from enforcement of federal law, the Supreme
Court, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,58 held that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal district court from or-
dering state officials to conform their conduct to state law. 59 This
limitation applies regardless of the remedy sought when the state is
the real, substantial party in interest.60
A state may waive its sovereign immunity privilege either ex-
plicitly or implicitly.61 For example, a state that voluntarily enters
into federal litigation to seek the benefits of a potential judgment
waives sovereign immunity.62 The general rule of construction, as
54. See id. at 143-44 (stating basis for jurisdiction rested in presence of federal
question despite absence of diversity of citizenship); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974) (upholding prospective injunction for relief against state official
while barring action for monetary damages based on supremacy of federal law).
Suits for prospective relief are deemed to be suits against the individual official,
while suits that seek retroactive relief are found to be suits against the state. See
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-66.
55. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60 (holding that State has no power to
grant state official any immunity from responsibility to supreme authority of
United States).
56. 768 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985).
57. See id. at 1034 (stating that "underlying purpose ofExparte Young seems to
require its application of claims against state officials for violations of federal
statutes.").
58. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
59. See id. at 101 (holding states retain exclusive interest in enforcing state law
against state officers).
60. See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,
464 (1945)).
61. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 1999). In
Litman, the court found that a state can waive its sovereign immunity by either
"directly and affirmatively waiv[ing] its Eleventh Amendment immunity in a state
statute or constitutional provision, as long as the provision explicitly 'specifies the
state's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court"' or by "voluntarily partici-
pating in federal spending programs when Congress expresses 'a clear intent to
condition participation in the programs... on a State's consent to waive its consti-
tutional immunity.'" Id. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
241, 247 (1985)); see also Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997).
62. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (stating that Supreme
Court is "relieved from its consideration by the voluntary appearance of the State
in intervening as the claimant of the fund in court."); but see Edelman v. Jordan, 415
2002]
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set forth in Bell Atlantic Maryland v. MCI Worldcom, Inc.,63 holds that
"[i]f Congress is not unmistakably clear and unequivocal in its in-
tent to condition a gift or gratuity on a State's waiver of its sovereign
immunity, [the courts] cannot presume that a State ... knowingly
and voluntarily assented to such a condition."64 On the other
hand, other cases suggest that a state's voluntary participation in a
federal regulatory program may implicitly authorize suit in federal
court.65 Thus, absent unambiguous state consent to suit in federal
court or unequivocal expression of Congressional intent to abro-
gate that state's immunity by virtue of its participation in a federal
regulatory program, federal courts lack sufficient jurisdiction to or-
der a state official to conform his or her conduct to state law.66
C. The Role of SMCRA in Primacy States: Federal Law, State
Law, or Both?
The current dispute in enforcing SMCRA centers in part on
whether the Act constitutes state or federal law for primacy states.67
The determination of this question decides the proper jurisdiction
for citizen suits and constitutional validity of section 1270(a) citizen
suit provisions under state approved SMCRA programs. 68
Supreme Court decisions provide no direct precedent regard-
ing the application of the Eleventh Amendment to SMCRA. The
Supreme Court, however, provided some guidance when it upheld
U.S. 651, 651-52 (1974) (noting, however, that state may not have waived sovereign
immunity if state had not conferred authority to waive on official defending its
interests).
63. 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001).
64. Id. at 292; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996)
(stating Congress may abrogate state's constitutionally secured immunity from suit
in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in language of
statute).
65. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424
(9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter NRDC] (holding that Clean Water Act did not pre-
scribe limits on citizen suits in federal court against state officer for violation of
CWA, thereby implicitly authorizing federal jurisdiction over claims against Direc-
tor for prospective injunctive relief for violations of CWA). The Seminole Tribe case
suggests, however, that receipt of federal funds by a state does not by itself suffice
to show that a state has consented to suit in federal court. See Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 59 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985)).
66. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)(noting that reluctance to infer State's immunity from suit in federal courts has
been negated stems from recognition of vital role of doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in federal system).
67. See Bragg v. W Va. Mining Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 294-95 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that West Virginia's SMCRA program acts as state law).
68. See id. at 295-96 (alleging that primacy states act through state law, there-
fore, Eleventh Amendment exempts officials from citizen suits in federal court).
10
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SMCRA against a Tenth Amendment constitutional challenge. 69 In
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n 70 various coal
interests brought a pre-enforcement action to challenge the enact-
ment of SMCRA.71 In Hodel, the Court held that Congress did not
exceed its powers under the Commerce Clause or transgress limita-
tions on the exercise of that power set out in the Fifth and Tenth
Amendments in legislating the Act. 72
Yet, recently in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,73 the Supreme
Court applied Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to strike
down part of another federal regulation.74 The Seminole Tribe Court
addressed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), authorizing
an Indian tribe to bring suit in federal court to compel state compli-
ance with that Act. 75 The Court held that the Ex parte Young excep-
tion would not apply to enforce IGRA against a state official
because of the detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of
the statutorily created right set forth in that Act.76 Thus, the Semi-
nole Tribe Court added another hurdle for surviving an Eleventh
Amendment challenge under a federal regulatory program: the
lack of a detailed remedial scheme for enforcement of the statuto-
rily-created right.77
Subsequent to the Seminole Tribe case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense Council
69. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 292
(1981) (remarking that SMCRA "resembles a number of other federal statutes that
have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower federal courts.").
70. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
71. See id. at 268 (challenging SMCRA based on commerce clause, Tenth
Amendment, and Just Compensation and Due Process Clauses of Fifth
Amendment).
72. See id. (declaring SMCRA "does not suffer from any of [the] alleged con-
stitutional defects.").
73. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
74. See id. at 47, 52-54.
75. See id. (citing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7)
(1994) [hereinafter IGRA]).
76. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-74 (stating that where Congress has cre-
ated detailed remedial scheme courts should be hesitant to supplement that
scheme with one created by judiciary). Under IGRA, Congress intended that the
remedy for a state's failure to negotiate in good faith be an order directing the
state and tribe to conclude the compact within sixty days. See id. at 74. Failure to
do so would result in a sanction requiring each party to select a mediator, who is to
select the compact best embodied by the terms of IGRA. See id. Further, neglect
by the state to accept the mediator's compact would result in notice to the Secre-
tary of the Interior, who then prescribes regulations governing gaming on the
lands at issue. See id. at 74-75.
77. See id. at 73-75 (warning that courts should hesitate before casting aside
detailed remedial scheme set forth by Congress).
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v. California Department of Transportation (NRDC) ,v8 affirmed a judg-
ment for prospective injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) citizen suit provision, despite the defendant's position as a
California state official.7 9 There, the Ninth Circuit held that Ex
parte Young strips the state official of his sovereign immunity be-
cause of CWA's role as federal law.80 The NRDC court distin-
guished the Seminole Tribe case by finding that Congress implicitly
intended the CWA citizen suit provision to authorize private citi-
zens to bring an action against a state official in federal court "to
the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment."81 Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit posits that the inclusion of the citizen suit "to the
extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment" allows suits for pro-
spective injunctive relief from a state official's future conduct.82
The circuit courts appear split on the issue of proper jurisdic-
tion under the citizen suit provision and SMCRA's general charac-
ter as a state or federal law. In Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining,83 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed the
lead of Seminole Tribe and found that an action for damages against
a private defendant under SMCRA lacked federal subject matter ju-
risdiction. 84 Instead, the Third Circuit ruled that affording SMCRA
federal jurisdiction "would render meaningless the Congressional
offer in [SMCRA] of 'exclusive' jurisdiction to states obtaining ap-
proval of a regulatory plan."85 Thus, under Haydo, state plans ap-
78. 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996).
79. See id. at 421 (finding director of California Department of Transporta-
tion liable for noncompliance with permit requiring control of polluted runoff);
see also Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305,
309-10 (9th Cir. 1993) (providing no Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
protection for members of California Regional Water Quality Control Board for
prospective injunctive relief under CWA); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Mazurkiewicz,
712 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (permitting citizen suit for injunctive
relief against state official under CWA); Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 909
F. Supp. 133, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing citizen suit for prospective injunctive
relief against state official for future violations of CWA).
80. See NRDC, 96 F.3d at 422-23 (stating that "a plaintiff may bring suit against
a state office accused of violating federal law.").
81. Id. at 424 (relying on Seminole Tribe's contrast of IGRA from "those statutes
'where lower courts have found that Congress implicitly authorized suit under Ex
parte Young,' such as the [CWA]"); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994) (stating citi-
zen suit provision of CWA).
82. See NRDC, 96 F.3d at 422-24 (noting Mancuso decision permitting action).
83. 830 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1987).
84. See id. at 498-99 (stating holding of Third Circuit Court of Appeals).
85. Id. at 497-98 (noting obvious, ordinary meaning of "exclusive" and intent
of Congress to recognize unique geography in each state). The Haydo decision
places heavy reliance on 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a), which "vests the Secretary with exclu-
sive jurisdiction for the regulation and control of surface coal mining and reclama-
tion operations." Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2001)).
12
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proved under SMCRA operate as state law and do not provide
federal question jurisdiction.86
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit provides
support for evaluating SMCRA primacy state programs as state law
in National Wildlife Federation v. Lujan.8 7 In Lujan, the National
Wildlife Federation brought suit to challenge certain regulation
modifications set forth by the Secretary of the Interior.88 The Sec-
retary modified those regulations to require correction of material
subsidence damage "only to the extent of state law."89 The court
held in favor of the Secretary, finding the modifications were based
on a reasonable interpretation of SMCRA.90 More importantly, the
concurring opinion emphasized that the federal SMCRA provision
does not technically apply in primacy states.91 Instead, state law de-
termines an operator's obligations in a primacy state. 92 Accord-
ingly, "the person's cause of action will be in state court under the
state law equivalent of [the federal subsidence control regula-
tion]."9 Here, the concurrence conflicts with an earlier D.C. Cir-
cuit case, In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.94
Conversely, West Virginia state courts and the Fourth Circuit
both recognize the supremacy of the federal SMCRA law over state
86. See Haydo, 830 F.2d at 498-99 (holding operator's violation of permit con-
dition does not violate SMCRA itself, even though SMCRA mandates that condi-
tion be imposed).
87. 928 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 455. The National Wildlife Federation challenged the subsidence
control regulations and those regulations establishing the effective date of the reg-
ulation of off-site physical processing plants. See id. at 455 n.1. "Subsidence occurs
when a patch of land over an underground mine sinks, shifts, or otherwise changes
its configuration." Id. at 455.
89. Id. at 456. The original subsidence control regulation "required an un-
derground coal operator to restore land materially damaged by subsidence and to
repair each damaged structure, to purchase the damaged structure at fair market
value, or to compensate the owner for the diminution in value." Id. at 455-56. The
modified regulation limited the correction of material subsidence damage to struc-
tures "only to the extent required by state law." Id. at 456.
90. See id. at 463 (stating court's holding).
91. See id. at 464 n.1 (Wald, J., concurring) (placing remedy for violation of
§ 520(f) under state court's jurisdiction).
92. See Lujan, 928 F.2d at 464 (relying on language of § 1253 to grant "exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation opera-
tions . . ").
93. Id.; see also Laurel Pipe Line Co. v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 624 F. Supp.
538, 539-41 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (denying jurisdiction in federal court under subsi-
dence control regulation and asserting that Pennsylvania assumed exclusive juris-
diction over surface coal mining and state court provides proper jurisdiction).
94. 653 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirmingjudgment of district court in
that SMCRA "gives the Secretary rulemaking power to prescribe minimum infor-
mation requirements for permit applications submitted to state regulatory
agencies.").
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regulations.95 In Canestraro v. Faerber,96 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals struck down a provision in the state regulatory
program, setting forth an application filing requirement less strin-
gent than the federal provisions.97 The Canestraro court recognized
that Congress clearly intended state provisions to be at least as strin-
gent as those in the federal SMCRA provisions. 98 The court thus
held that "[t]he state program need not be identical to the federal
program, as long as its provisions are at least as stringent as those
provided for in the federal act."99 When a conflict arises between a
state and federal provision, the less restrictive state provision yields
to the more stringent federal provision "notwithstanding the ad-
ministrative approval of the state law by OSM."' 0
Counter to the Haydo decision, the Fourth Circuit, in Molinaly
v. Powell Mountain Coal Co.,101 held that SMCRA section 1270(f)
provides a federal cause of action to private citizens for the recovery
of damages that had arisen from a private coal company's violation
of state regulations under Virginia's adopted SMCRA program. 10 2
In upholding the district court's rejection of Powell Mountain's mo-
95. See generally Canestraro v. Faerber, 374 S.E.2d 319 (W. Va. 1998) (holding
that federal filing provision remained applicable to extent that it is more stringent
than parallel state provision); Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 125 F.3d 231
(4th Cir. 1997) (allowing SMCRA citizen suit in federal court).
96. 374 S.E.2d 319 (W. Va. 1988).
97. Id. at 319-20. In Canestraro, West Virginia's SMCRA program required an
operator to file a copy of a permit application to enlarge a coal waste dam "in the
nearest office of the department of energy" to allow for public comment. Id. at
320 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-9(c) (1985)). On the other hand, the federal
act mandates that an operator file such a permit "with the recorder at the court-
house of the county or an appropriate public office approved by the regulatory
authority where the mining is proposed to occur." Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1257(e)
(1994) and Surface Coal Mining Requirements for Permits and Permitting Pro-
cess, 30 C.F.R. § 773.13(a) (2) (1994)).
98. See Canestraro, 374 S.E.2d at 320-21 (referencing language in 30 U.S.C.§ 1253, which states in pertinent part that state law must be "in accordance with"
and "consistent with regulations issued by the Secretary pursuant to this Act.").
99. Id. at 320 n.2 (noting supremacy and preemption of federal SMCRA pro-
visions of state provision that fall short of federal standard).
100. Id. at 321 (stating that "[n]othing in the Act or these regulations shall be
interpreted to preclude a State from exercising its authority to enforce State law
... unless compliance with the State law... will preclude compliance with these
regulations.").
101. 125 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1997).
102. Id. at 232 (affirming, in part, holding of appellate court). In Molinary,
the Virginia Department of Mined Land Reclamation [hereinafter DMRL] had
improperly granted Powell a permit for auger mining operations, leading plaintiffs
to file an action under 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) for the recovery of damages against
Powell Mountain Coal. See id. at 233. DMRL subsequently revoked the permit,
finding that the permit did not comply with state law in failing to list all record
holders and to evidence that they had authority to extract the coal by surface min-
ing. See id. After the plaintiff filed a class action suit, Powell moved to dismiss for
14
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tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court of
appeals relied on the idea that the state-promulgated regulations
were "issued pursuant to" SMCRA and that Congress intended sec-
tion 1270(f) to provide for federal citizen suits.10 3
Notably, the court dismissed the notion that the federal grant
of exclusive jurisdiction mandates that claims be brought in state
court because "[e]xclusive regulatory jurisdiction simply does not
encompass exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction. Common sense dic-
tates that a government's acts in regulating a subject are distinctly
different than its acts in adjudicating a party's rights related to the
subject."10 4 Yet, similar to the decisions in Bragg and in West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Norton,10 5 the Fourth Circuit will no longer
allow citizen suits to be brought in federal court. 10 6
The Tenth Circuit has also addressed the issue of whether a
state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suits for pro-
spective injunctive relief under SMCRA. 10 7 In Powder River Basin Re-
sources Council v. Babbitt, s08 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned the district court's finding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment barred an action by Wyoming residents under SMCRA to re-
cover expenses incurred during the case and to obtain injunctive
relief.109 In so holding, the court relied on the distinction between
the prospective and retrospective nature of relief sought, rather
than any challenge that the approved state program constituted
state law.110 Thus, the Powder River Basin court implicitly recog-
nized SMCRA as federal law and differentiated those actions per-
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. The district court's rejection of that
motion, in part, prompted the appeal by Powell Mountain Coal. See id. at 233-34.
103. See id. at 236, 237 (basing its decision on interpretation of text of
§ 1270(f) and "Congress' [sic] goal of establishing 'a nationwide program to pro-
tect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining
operations.'").
104. Id. The court also attributed the major shortcoming in the Haydo v.
Amerikohl Mining decision to the Third Circuit ignoring that "the word 'exclusive'
in § 503(a) modifies the phrase 'regulatory jurisdiction' and nothing more." Id. at
236 n.5, 237.
105. 147 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
106. See id. at 475 (following Bragg decision reluctantly in barring citizen suit
based on Eleventh Amendment).
107. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477 (10th Cir.
1995) (deciding validity of citizen suit seeking injunctive relief).
108. 54 F.3d 1477 (10th Cir. 1995).
109. Id. at 1482. The court, however, decided the case against the plaintiffs
because the case against the federal defendants was not ripe in light of Wyoming's
ongoing attempt to comply with federal directives and because the state had subse-
quently amended its rule-making procedures. See id. at 1482.
110. See id. at 1483 (finding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by Eleventh
Amendment).
2002]
15
Crotty: Bragg v. West Virginia Mining Association: The Eleventh Amendment
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
302 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNA. [Vol. XIII: p. 287
missible under the Eleventh Amendment, using a traditional
retrospective-prospective distinction.11
A number of other courts have addressed the issue of whether
under cooperative federalism schemes, environmental statutes with
citizen suit provisions similar to SMCRA act as state or federal law.
For example, in Ashoff v. City of Ukiah,112 the Ninth Circuit held that
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) authorizes
citizen suits for violations of the federal minimum standards of the
Act, while not providing such citizen suits based on state standards
more stringent than federal regulations. 113 The court reasoned
that the text of RCRA requires a state's adopted program to "assure
each solid waste management facility within such State... will com-
ply with the [revised] criteria."1 14 Further, those federal criteria
give the state standards legal effect under federal law.115
111. See id. at 1482-83. Courts have traditionally recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment bars an action if the state is the real, substantial party in interest. See
id. at 1483 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
The Powder River Basin court evaded this concept by determining that the real,
substantial party in interest depends on the type of relief plaintiffs sought. See
Powder River Basin, 54 F.3d at 1483. "Suits that seek prospective relief are deemed
to be suits against the official, while suits that seek retroactive relief are deemed to
be suits against the state." Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-66
(1964)). Thus, "[b]ecause plaintiffs request sought prospective, as opposed to
retroactive, relief, the claim was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id.
112. 130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997).
113. See id. at 411-12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter
RCRA] governs the management of hazardous and non-hazardous solid wastes. See
id. at 410. In RCRA, Congress provided each state the opportunity to "adopt and
implement a permit program or other system [that ensures compliance with the
federal criteria.]" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(1)(B) (2001)).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(1)(B) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6903(14) (1994)
(providing additional example where federal regulations provide citizen suit even
after EPA has approved state program).
115. See Powder River Basin, 130 F.3d at 411. EPA also notes its position that
"the citizen suit provision of RCRA is available to all citizens whether or not a state
is authorized" and that "any person, whether in an authorized or unauthorized
State, may sue to enforce compliance with statutory and regulatory standards." Id.
at 412 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,304 (Dec. 12, 1984) and 45 Fed. Reg. 85,016,
85,021 (Dec. 24, 1980)). There is considerable controversy as to whether RCRA
citizen suits may be brought to enforce the provisions of state approved programs.
See Glaser v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Serv. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(finding that plaintiffs could enforce Texas' hazardous waste program by bringing
citizen suit under RCRA); see also Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33
(D. Me. 1994) (allowing citizen suit for violation of closure and post closure re-
quirements of RCRA as violation of state authorized program); Sierra Club v.
Chem. Handling Corp., 824 F. Supp. 195 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding citizen suit
provision of RCRA could be used to enforce regulations promulgated under state's
hazardous waste program); but see Clorox v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding Illinois hazardous waste program superseded RCRA sec-
tion providing for citizen suit against person alleged to be in violation of permit).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
In Bragg, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that under SMCRA's citizen suit provision, the Ex parte Young excep-
tion did not strip the state of Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity and that actions by West Virginia did not constitute any
waiver of such immunity. 116 The court initially noted that the Su-
preme Court has strictly limited the application of the Ex parte
Young doctrine and that proposed exceptions must entail more
than "a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction." 1 7 To determine
whether Ex parte Young applied in the present case, the Fourth Cir-
cuit analyzed the character of SMCRA and its status as either state
or federal law.118
The court began with an evaluation of the state and federal
interests at stake, primarily relying on the legislative history, text,
and construction of SMCRA. °19 The court posited that Congress
crafted SMCRA to advance state interests by creating the potential
for exclusive regulatory jurisdiction.120 The court stated that "the
federal interest would be better served by encouraging private citi-
zens to enforce their claims relating to the State enforcement ef-
forts in state, rather than federal, court."121
The crux of the Fourth Circuit's argument rests on the notion
that, in primacy states, SMCRA applies as state, not federal, law.122
In support of this motion, the court looked to the text and legisla-
tive intent behind the Act. 123 "SMCRA was expressly designed to
hand over to the States the task of enforcing minimum national
standards for surface coal mining, providing only limited federal
116. See Bragg v. W. Va. Mining Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001) (apply-
ing Ex parte Young and concluding that Eleventh Amendment does not preclude
citizen suits).
117. Id. at 292-93 (citing Idaho v. CoeurD'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997)).
118. See id. at 293 (analyzing character of SMCRA).
119. See id. (noting that court must "evaluate the degree to which a State's
sovereign interest would be adversely affected ... as well as the extent to which
federal, rather than State, law must be enforced to vindicate the federal interest.").
120. See id.
121. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 293; see also 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1994) (noting
grant of primary responsibility for enforcing state program in light of "diversity in
terrain, climate, biologic, chemical and other physical conditions.").
122. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295-96 (stating that injunction against state official
to enforce § 1260 provisions involves state law given that state has exclusive regula-
tory jurisdiction).
123. See id. at 293-96 (reviewing statutory text and legislative history).
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mechanisms to oversee State enforcement." 124 In this respect, the
court held that SMCRA cannot be accurately characterized as "co-
operative federalism" analogous to the cooperative federalism
scheme in the Clean Water Act.125
Instead, SMCRA established a system of mutually exclusive ju-
risdictions where either federal or state law regulates surface coal
mining activity, "but not both simultaneously."126 Once a state
gains "primacy" status, that state acquires jurisdiction mutually ex-
clusive of the federal government. 127 Yet, the state does not auto-
matically forfeit that mutually exclusive jurisdiction when failing to
enforce the minimum national standards set forth by the federal
SMCRA.128 Instead, the federal government maintains limited
oversight in being able to review and revoke "primacy" status
through an ordered procedure. 129 Thus, SMCRA conditionally di-
vests the federal government of direct regulatory and enforcement
authority. 130 Notably, the court found that, with the grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction, "Congress intended that the federal law establish-
ing minimum national standards would 'drop out' as operative
law," allowing state law to fill the gap.13'
Therefore, given its finding that SMCRA constitutes state law in
primacy states, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's in-
junction "was so abhorrent to the values underlying our federal
structure as to fall outside the bounds of Ex parte Young, and thus,
124. Id. at 293 (concluding federal interest better served through state
enforcement).
125. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 293-94 (distinguishing SMCRA from CWA); but see
Bragg, 248 F.3d at 297 (citing United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,
625 (1992)) (noting that state law penalties under CWA did not "arise under fed-
eral law.").
126. See id. at 293-94 (asserting character of implementation proposed by
SMCRA).
127. See id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1994)) (characterizing § 1283(a) as
granting primacy states "exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal
mining .... ").
128. See id. at 289 (asserting that federal standards do not reengage until com-
mencement of § 1271 proceeding).
129. See 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b)-(d) (1994) (setting out statutory procedure for
revoking primacy status and federal agency's capability to review and revoke).
130. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294-95 (stating that SMCRA only remains applica-
ble on matters relating to good standing of state program).
131. Id. (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 464 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1991) and Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1987) as authority).
The court notes, however, that not all SMCRA provisions drop out. See id. at 295-
96. "The Act's structural provisions creating the facility through which the State
can attain and can lose its primacy status remain directly operative." Id.; see also 30
U.S.C. § 1254(b)-(d) (1994) (setting out procedure by which federal agency can
review and revoke state's implementation, regulation, and enforcement of mini-
mum national standards).
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that exception does not apply." 132 Instead, the court found that
Pennhurst dictates that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
shields the state from suit in federal court.133 Having found disposi-
tive the concept that state-approved SMCRA programs operate as
state law, the Bragg court did not address the argument raised
under Seminole Tribe regarding the possibility of a detailed remedial
scheme as a further bar to the Eleventh Amendment. 34
The Fourth Circuit further concluded that West Virginia's
mere participation in SMCRA did not constitute a waiver of sover-
eign immunity. 135 The court reiterated that any waiver of sovereign
immunity must be "unmistakably clear and unequivocal." 136 Under
SMCRA, Congress issued no "unequivocal" warning of any
waiver. 137 Instead, the citizen suit provision appears to preserve
state sovereignty in limiting such suits "to the extent permitted by
the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution." 138 Thus, West
Virginia did not waive its Eleventh Amendment protection.
13 9
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit held that the Eleventh
Amendment bars SMCRA citizen suits in federal court given that
SMCRA should be characterized as state law, that Pennhurst dictates
that a federal court lacks sufficient jurisdiction to enjoin a state of-
ficer to conform his or her conduct to state law, and that West Vir-
ginia did not waive that immunity.140
132. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296-97 (finding Exparte Young exception simply unnec-
essary to "vindicate the supreme authority of federal law" in this context).
133. See id. (finding that states maintain unique interest in enforcing state law
against state officers as per Pennhurst decision).
134. See id. at 290 n.3 (stating "[b]ecause we dispose of this case on other
grounds, we do not address this argument.").
135. See id. at 298 (addressing Bragg's contention that participation in federal
SMCRA constituted waiver of sovereign immunity).
136. Id. at 298. "if Congress is not unmistakably clear and unequivocal in its
intent to condition a gift or gratuity on a State's waiver of its sovereign immunity,
we cannot presume that a State, by accepting Congress' [sic] proffer, knowingly
and voluntarily assented to such condition." Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc.
v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir. 2001)).
137. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 298 (finding no clear indicia to put state on notice
that participation in SMCRA would waive Eleventh Amendment protection).
138. Id. at 298; see also Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting similar intent to preserve state immunity under CWA, RCRA, and
CERCLA).
139. See id. at 298 (rejecting Bragg's argument that West Virginia waived its
sovereign immunity privilege).
140. See id. at 293, 296, 298 (summarizing conclusions of court).
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B. Critical Analysis: Is SMCRA Federal or State Law?
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Bragg contravenes a long list
of precedent and the express language of SMCRA, characterizing
the Act's primacy program as a mutually exclusive state, rather than
federal, law.141 Instead, the language and cases suggest that a citi-
zen suit against West Virginia's approved program escapes sover-
eign immunity challenges through Ex parte Young and can be
brought in federal court under section 1270(a) (2).142
To begin, the express language and legislative history of SM-
CRA confirm that federally-approved provisions of state programs
arise under federal law. 143 Section 1270(a)(2) authorizes citizen
suits "against the Secretary or the appropriate State regulatory au-
thority" in the event of a failure to enforce "any act or duty under
this chapter.'144 If the Fourth Circuit was correct in that the federal
minimum standards "drop out" and that SMCRA is a mutually ex-
clusive state law, then section 1270(a) (2) would only apply against
OSM. 145 Under the court's interpretation of SMCRA as state law,
state regulators could never be sued in a federal citizen suit after
program approval. 146 "If Congress had intended this result, it
would have referred only to the 'Secretary' in [section] 1270(a) (2),
rather than to the 'Secretary or the appropriate State regulatory
authority.'",,47 Furthermore, the Bragg court provided no basis for
discerning state actions that constitute a violation of section
1270 (a) (2) under an approved state program from those actions
that do not. 48
Additionally, section 1260(b) requires permits to comply with
"all the requirements of this chapter and the State or Federal pro-
141. See Ken Ward, 4th Circuit Asked to Reconsider Mining Ruling, SUNDAY MAIL-
GAZETrE ONLINE, July 1, 2001, at http://sundaygazettemail.com/news/
Other+News/2001070126/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2001) (discussing ramifications of
Bragg decision).
142. See id. (reviewing precedent).
143. See Brief of Amici Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, et al. at 83,
Bragg v. West Virginia Mining Assoc., 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-2443),
available at http://www.wvgazette.com/static/series/mining/briefs/plaintiffs.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (refuting assertion that federally-approved provisions of
state program arise under state law).
144. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2) (1994) (emphasis added) (discussing civil action
to compel compliance).
145. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 142, at 98.
146. See id. (noting impact of allowing Eleventh Amendment to bar federal
citizen suits).
147. Id. (citing inconsistency between express language of § 1270(a) (2) and
Fourth Circuit's finding that citizen suits against West Virginia may not be brought
in federal court).
148. See id. (highlighting inconsistency).
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gram." 149 To obtain state program approval, section 1253(a) re-
quires state programs to have state law and state rules and
regulations consistent with the requirements of the federal SM-
CRA.150 Further, section 1255(a) provides that the state law shall
not be superseded "except insofar as such State law or regulation is
inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter."15 1 Thus, SMCRA's
plain language suggests that the West Virginia state program must,
at a minimum, comply with the provisions of the federal Act.152
This language directly challenges the Fourth Circuit's finding that
the federal minimum standards "drop out" upon the OSM's adop-
tion of the state program.1 53
The legislative history also challenges this notion that the fed-
eral minimum standards "drop out. '154 Indeed, during Congres-
sional consideration of SMCRA, "Congress twice rejected a states'
rights amendment that would have allowed states with comparable
laws to 'opt out and run their own program.'" 1 55
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's decision ignored a wealth of
judicial precedent supporting the contention that those explicit
SMCRA provisions require the state regulatory authority to adhere
to the federal minimum standards, rather than "drop out.1 56 In
Canestraro, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a
149. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added) (discussing require-
ments for permit approval).
150. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(b)(1), (6) (1994) (discussing approval of state
programs).
151. 30 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1994) (providing evidence that federal guidelines
remain operative as minimum level of acceptable state enforcement).
152. For additional examples of SMCRA provisions that suggest a require-
ment of compliance with minimum federal standards, see 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)
(1994) (stating that '[g]eneral performance standards shall ... require the opera-
tion as a minimum.") (emphasis added). See also 30 U.S.C. § 1291(26) (1994) (de-
fining "State regulatory authority" as "the department or agency in each state
which has primary responsibility at the State level for administering this chap-
ter') (emphasis added); 30 U.S.C. § 1291(22) (1994) (defining "regulatory author-
ity" to mean "the State regulatory authority where the State is administering the
chapter under an approved state program") (emphasis added); 30 U.S.C.
§ 1291(25) (1994) (defining "state program" as "program established ... in accord
with the requirements of this chapter and regulations issued by the Secretary pursuant
to this Act.") (emphasis added).
153. See Bragg v. W Va. Mining Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 295 (4th Cir. 2001) (stat-
ing that "Congress intended that [ ] federal law establishing minimum national
standards would 'drop out' as operative law .. ").
154. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 142, at 89. The very reason for the
enactment of federal surface mining law was inadequate state regulation in this
area. See id.
155. Id. at 90 (citing 123 CONG. REc. 15581-90 (1977) (Sen. Danforth) and
121 CONG. REc. 6185-87 (1975)).
156. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295 (relying on Lujan and Haydo for support).
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"less restrictive state provision must yield to the more stringent fed-
eral provision notwithstanding the administrative approval of the
state law by OSM."1 57 The court further noted that "[t]he state pro-
gram need not be identical to the federal program, as long as its
provisions are at least as stringent as those provided for in the fed-
eral act." 158 Thus, Canestraro indicates that West Virginia recognizes
the supremacy and preemption of federal SMCRA provisions over
state-approved program provisions.
Similarly, in Hodel, the Supreme Court upheld SMCRA as con-
stitutional, noting that the Act "prescribes federal minimum stan-
dards governing surface coal mining, which a State may either
implement itself or else yield to a federally administered pro-
gram."159 The Court also found that SMCRA establishes a coopera-
tive federalism scheme with the states as regulatory enforcers,
within the limits established by those federal minimum stan-
dards. 160 In addition, the Hodel Court noted that it "fail[s] to see
why the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect
simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory
role."161 Thus, the Supreme Court, in Hodel, endorsed the notion
that federal minimum standards remain operative despite a state's
primacy status. 16 2
157. Canestraro v. Faerber, 374 S.E.2d 319, 321 (W. Va. 1988); see also Trustee
for Alaska v. Comm'r, 835 P.2d 1239 (Alaska 1992) (holding that Alaska SMCRA
statute is superseded only where inconsistent with federal statute); DK Excavating
v. Miano, 549 S.E.2d 280, 284 (W. Va. 2001) (noting that Congress made clear
from date of SMCRA's enactment, any state regulation in effect or subsequently
enacted would be preempted where state laws are inconsistent with provisions of
SMCRA, unless state laws provide for regulation more stringent than that required
by SMCRA).
158. Canestraro, 374 S.E.2d at 320. The Canestraro case pointed to a conflict
between the state and federal acts as to the required location for filing a permit.
See id. The federal SMCRA requires that the permit application be filed "with the
recorder at the courthouse of the county where the mining is proposed to occur."
30 U.S.C. § 1257(e) (1994). Conversely, the state SMCRA only requires that a copy
of the permit application be filed "in the nearest office" of the department of
energy. W. VA. CODE § 22-3-9(c) (1985).
159. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289
(1981) (holding that SMCRA was not unconstitutional violation of Tenth
Amendment).
160. See id. at 289 (finding that SMCRA's cooperative federalism character
resembles other environmental statutes that have survived Tenth Amendment
challenge).
161. Id. at 290 (emphasis added) (stating that Congress could have enacted
statute that preempts state surface law).
162. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 142, at 87; see also Powder River Basin
Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment does not bar citizen suit against state official of Wyoming under SM-
CRA); United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 43-45 (1st
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Further, the Fourth Circuit in Bragg inappropriately relied on
Lujan and Haydo in support of its determination that those federal
minimum standards "drop out."163 Lujan, however, lacks persuasive
authority because that view comes from the sole concurrence, not
endorsed by the other circuitjudges. 164 Instead, the Lujan majority
reversed the invalidation of the challenged regulations because the
state law limitation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior was
based on a reasonable interpretation of SMCRA and was neither
arbitrary nor capricious. 16 5
Also, the Fourth Circuit, in Bragg, inappropriately relied on the
Haydo decision in light of the Fourth Circuit's Molinay decision. 166
Similar to the fact scenario presented in Molinary, the plaintiffs in
Haydo sued to recover damages from a private defendant. 167 The
Fourth Circuit's Molinay decision is directly at odds with Haydo in
its interpretation of an individual's ability to bring a citizen suit re-
covery action against a private individual. 168 Indeed, Molinary ex-
Cir. 1991) (holding that approved state program under RCRA does not displace
federal program).
163. Bragg v. W. Va. Mining Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 295 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Nat'l WildlifeFed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.3d 453, 464 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Wald, J., con-
curring) and Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 830 F.2d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The court further noted Lujan's recognition that SMCRA provisions in primacy
states do not "technically apply." Id. In Haydo, the court noted that "SMCRA itself
is not violated by an operator's violation of a permit condition." Id.
164. See Lujan, 928 F.2d at 455. Circuit Judges Wald, Buckley and Sentelle
joined for the opinion of the court, while only Judge Wald filed the partial concur-
rence. See id. None of the judges filed a dissent andJudge Wald's concurrence was
not crucial in deciding the court's ultimate holding. See id.
165. See id. at 456 (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984)) (relying on standards Supreme Court imposed in Chevron
and deferring to Secretary's judgment unless unreasonable or arbitrary and
capricious).
166. See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295 (discussing how, under Haydo, West Virginia's
status as primacy state prevents federal provisions establishing minimum national
standards from directly operating on state). For further discussion of the Molinary
decision, see supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
167. See Haydo, 830 F.2d at 495. In Haydo, property owners brought suit
against Amerikohl Mining under § 1270(0 to recover for damage caused to their
well. See id. Likewise, in Molinary, the plaintiffs brought suit under § 1270(f) to
recover damages caused by the Powell Mountain Coal Company's failure to comply
with Virginia permit regulations. See Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 125 F.3d
231, 233 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 1270(f) provides that "[a]ny person who is in-
jured in his person or property through violation by any operator of any rule,
regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to [SMCRA] may bring an action for
damages ... ." 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (1994).
168. See Haydo, 830 F.2d at 496. The Haydo court determined that § 1270(f)
"does not provide for an action against individual defendants for violations of the
act itself." Id. In contrast, Molinary concluded that § 1270(f) provides a federal
cause of action for recovery of damages resulting from violation of state regula-
tions. See Molinary, 125 F.3d at 232.
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plicitly rejected the Haydo decision, stating that "Haydo ignores the
fact that the word 'exclusive' . . . modifies the phrase 'regulatory
jurisdiction,' and nothing more."169 The Bragg court, however,
found that exclusive regulatory jurisdiction fails to encompass ex-
clusive adjudicatory jurisdiction.1 70 Thus, the Bragg decision de-
parts from the earlier Fourth Circuit ruling as well as the wealth of
other precedent.
Moreover, despite dismissing the claimant's citizen suit against
a private individual, the language in Haydo supports bringing citi-
zen suits in federal court against state and federal officials. 171 Nota-
bly, Haydo recognizes that "citizen suits against state and federal
governmental defendants may be predicated directly upon viola-
tions of the provisions of [ ] SMCRA. '172 The court further noted
that "[t]he principal purpose of the citizen suit provision was to
provide 'a practical and legitimate method of assuring the regulatory
authority's compliance with the requirements of the act.'"173
Critics argue that previous precedent suggests a more reasona-
ble interpretation of SMCRA's cooperative federalism - the state en-
acting and enforcing the federal law.174 In re Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation suggests that the Secretary and the pub-
lic, "which is given the right to sue in federal court," share oversight
function to compel compliance with the state program. 175 This
wording supports the role of states under SMCRA as "'deputized'
federal regulators." 176
169. Molinay, 125 F.3d at 236 n.5 (rejecting basis set forth by Third Circuit in
Haydo decision).
170. See id. at 236 (stating "[c]ommon sense dictates that a government's acts
in regulating a subject are distinctly different than its acts in adjudicating a party's
rights related to the subject.").
171. See Haydo, 830 F.2d at 496-97 (finding SMCRA does not provide for con-
current jurisdiction shared between state and federal agencies).
172. Id. at 496. "[SMCRA §] 520 does not provide for an action against indi-
vidual defendants for violations of the act itself." Id.
173. Id. at 497 (citing legislative history).
174. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 142, at 88 (arguing that if state
elects to participate as "state regulatory authority," SMCRA requires state officials
to comply with both minimum requirements of Act and provisions of federally-
approved state program).
175. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 516, 518-19
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that SMCRA gives Secretary power to enact minimum
information requirements for permit applications submitted to state regulatory
agencies).
176. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 344 (7th
Cir. 2000) (stating that, under Telecommunications Act, Congress offered states
role as "deputized" federal regulator in exchange for submission to federal juris-
diction to review their actions).
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In conclusion, the express language of SMCRA, the relevant
legislative history and a dearth of precedent all suggest that federal
minimum standards do not "drop out" as suggested by the Fourth
Circuit and that the federal district court can be the proper jurisdic-
tion for a citizen suit action. Finally, the Fourth Circuit, in Bragg,
inappropriately relied on judicial precedent suggesting that those
federal minimum standards "drop out." Thus, rather than the Pen-
nhurst doctrine, the Ex parte Young exception applies, allowing state
citizens to sue their own state for prospective injunctive relief.
V. IMPACT
The recent Bragg decision threatens to level the effectiveness of
citizen suit provisions in SMCRA as well as many other environmen-
tal statutes. 177 As previously mentioned, most environmental stat-
utes enacted by Congress since the 1970s follow a scheme similar to
that under SMCRA. 178 Congress designed SMCRA as a cooperative
federalism enterprise that allows states the option to enact and en-
force a state program pursuant to the federal environmental regula-
tion, yet reserves individual citizens the opportunity to seek to
enjoin a state official from taking any future actions incongruent
with the federal program. 179 The Bragg decision would allow regu-
lations under those state programs to operate solely as state law
given that the federal regulations "drop out."'80 Thus, state courts
would serve as the appropriate and exclusive jurisdiction. 181 In this
manner, Bragg goes beyond Seminole Tribe in preventing citizen suits
in federal court.' 8 2
The National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) charges that
this decision and others like it will lead to a "race to the bottom" by
states to relax environmental standards to attract business. 183
177. See Buccino et al., supra note 13, at 15-17. The Bragg decision leaves citi-
zens "powerless to hold states accountable for violating federal statutory rights
.... " Id. at 15.
178. See Reynolds, supra note 43, at 78.
179. For a further discussion on cooperative federalism aspects of SMCRA, see
supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
180. See Bragg v. W Va. MiningAss'n, 248 F.3d 275, 295 (4th Cir. 2001) (assert-
ing that Congress intended federal law establishing minimum standards would
"drop out" as operative law).
181. See id.
182. See id. Indeed, under the Bragg decision, the court did not need to con-
sider the possibility of a detailed remedial scheme as per Seminole Tribe because of
its determination that regulations of state approved SMCRA programs constitute
state law. See id.
183. See Buccino et al., supra note 13, at 15 (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703-04 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
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NRDC makes this assertion in light of past state failures at environ-
mental protection.184 The group notes that "[i]t was the failure of
the states to deliver clean air and water to their citizens that led to
the passage of federal environmental legislation in the 1970's."185
Thus, this "activist ruling" will undoubtedly lead to innumerable vic-
tims and a degradation of national environmental policy.18 6
Indeed, the Bragg decision has already affected suits against
West Virginia's bonding program under SMCRA in West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, even though plaintiffs and defend-
ants both agreed that the bonding program violated federal law for
over a decade. 187 Even the Secretary of West Virginia's Department
of Environmental Protection, Michael Callaghan, testified that the
bond program is "absolutely insufficient," "woefully underfunded"
and "woefully inadequate."' 8 The impact on the effectiveness of
West Virginia's SMCRA program has been devastating. 189 Nonethe-
less, the district court Was bound by the Fourth Circuit's Bragg deci-
sion and must accept the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment
bars the suit because the West Virginia program operates as state
law.190 Thus, Bragg has already begun to preclude citizens from en-
dissenting) (stating need and intent of founders to rely on ordinary citizens for
enforcement of flexible legislative approach)).
184. See id. (noting reliance on state authority for protection of environment
has failed).
185. Id. (alleging ineffectiveness of state courts in past to remedy environ-
mental problems).
186. See id. NRDC posits that such degradation of federal statutory rights has
already caused problems for the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See id. at 15 nn.85 & 86 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) and Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)).
187. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 477-78
(S.D. W. Va. 2001) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred SMCRA citizen suit,
alleging that West Virginia's alternative bonding program for surface mine recla-
mation bonds was inadequate to meet minimum requirements of SMCRA).
188. Id. at 476 (noting DEP Secretary's agreement that state bonding require-
ment operates as "system set up to fail."). According to Callaghan, current costs
for unreclaimed mine sites falling under SMCRA amount to approximately
$60,000,000 per year, while the special reclamation fund only has $12,000,000. See
id. The fund is basically insolvent. See id.
189. See id.
DEP figures show [245] past bond forfeitures in the state. Eighty-eight of
those forfeiture sites require water treatment, forty are 'urgent.' Cur-
rently, DEP is able to treat five of them. Due to inadequate funding, the
remaining eighty-three mine sites are in continuous violation of effluent
water pollution limits.
Id.
190. See id. at 480-81 (noting district court's reluctance in following Bragg de-
cision given text of SMCRA and other precedent). Chief Judge Haden, who also
presided over the Bragg case at the district level, submits that "as a faithful servant
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forcing federal environmental law even in light of a state's com-
plete failure to enforce its own program. 191
In conclusion, the Bragg decision contravenes a long list of pre-
cedent, a plain reading of the text and the legislative intent of Con-
gress. 192 The impact of the decision may threaten to degrade the
effectiveness of SMCRA and other environmental statutes.' 93 Such
a result will upset the delicate balance between federal and state
authorities sought under SMCRA and lead to a "race to the bottom"
by states to relax environmental standards. 194
Michael G. Crotty
of the law, [he] must apply strictly the law as proclaimed by the superior tribunal."
See id. at 481 n.9.
191. See id. at 481 (finding that West Virginia clearly violated SMCRA bond
requirement).
192. For a further discussion on the legislative history and precedent sur-
rounding SMCRA citizen suits, see supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text.
193. For a further discussion on the impact of this decision, see supra notes
177-94 and accompanying text.
194. For a further discussion on the potential "race to the bottom," see supra
note 182 and accompanying text.
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